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In an interactive belief model, are the players “commonly meta-certain” of the model itself? This
paper formalizes such implicit “common meta-certainty” assumption. To that end, the paper expands
the objects of players’ beliefs from events to functions defined on the underlying states. Then, the pa-
per defines a player’s belief-generating map: it associates, with each state, whether a player believes
each event at that state. The paper formalizes what it means by: “a player is (meta-)certain of her
own belief-generating map” or “the players are (meta-)certain of the profile of belief-generating maps
(i.e., the model).” The paper shows: a player is (meta-)certain of her own belief-generating map if
and only if her beliefs are introspective. The players are commonly (meta-)certain of the model if and
only if, for any event which some player i believes at some state, it is common belief at the state that
player i believes the event. This paper then asks whether the “common meta-certainty” assumption
is needed for an epistemic characterization of game-theoretic solution concepts. The paper shows:
if each player is logical and (meta-)certain of her own strategy and belief-generating map, then each
player correctly believes her own rationality. Consequently, common belief in rationality alone leads
to actions that survive iterated elimination of strictly dominated actions.
1 Introduction
In an economic or game-theoretic model in which the players make their interactive reasoning about their
strategies or rationality, the analysts “from outside of the model” assume that the players “commonly
know” the model itself. Since the pioneering work of [1, 2, 3], how to model such assumption and what
consequences such assumption has have been puzzling economic and game theorists.1
This paper has two objectives. The first aims at formalizing the “common knowledge” assump-
tion of a model within the model itself. An interactive belief/knowledge model represents players’ be-
liefs/knowledge about its ingredients, that is, events. The model itself does not tell whether the players
(commonly) believe/know the model itself, although the analysts assume that the players (commonly)
believe/know the model in a meta-sense. I refer to the knowledge/belief of the model as the “meta-
knowledge/meta-belief” of the model.2
The second objective is to examine the role that “meta-knowledge” of a model plays in game-
theoretic analyses such as epistemic characterizations of solution concepts. For a given epistemic charac-
terization of a game-theoretic solution concept such as iterated elimination of strictly dominated actions,
do the outside analysts need to formally assume that the players “meta-know” an epistemic model of a
game (that describes their interactive beliefs about their strategies and rationality)?
*I would like to thank three anonymous referees of TARK 2021 for their helpful comments. This is an abbreviated technical
summary of part of the full paper, which is available at the author’s website (https://websfukuda.com/research/).
1For this question, see also [4, 5], [6], [10, 11], [12], [13], [15], [16], [21], [25], [26], [30], [32], [33], [31], and [34].
2Since different epistemic models may feature different notions of qualitative or probabilistic beliefs or knowledge, I use
the word the “(meta-)certainty” of a model to refer generically to the meta-knowledge or meta-belief of the model.
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The first main result, presented in Section 4, characterizes the “common meta-certainty” assumption
as follows. According to the formal test to be discussed, the players are commonly (meta-)certain of a
model if and only if, for any event which some player i believes at some state, it is common belief that
player i believes the event at that state.
In Section 2, I start with introducing a (belief) model. The model consists of the following three
ingredients. The first is a measurable space of states of the word (Ω,D). Each state ω ∈ Ω is a list of
possible specifications of the world, and the collection D of events (i.e., subsets of Ω) are the objects
of the players’ beliefs. The second is the players’ monotone belief operators (Bi)i∈I . Player i’s belief
operator Bi associates, with each event E, the event that she believes E. Monotonicity means that if
player i believes E at a state and if E implies (i.e., is included in) F , then she believes F at that state.
The third is a common belief operator C, which associates, with each event E, the event that the players
commonly believe E. Under certain assumptions on the players’ beliefs, an event E is common belief if
and only if everybody believes E, everybody believes that everybody believes E, and so on ad infinitum.
The framework nests the following two standard models of belief or knowledge (or combinations
thereof). The first is a possibility correspondence model of qualitative belief or knowledge (e.g., [1, 3],
[15], [20], and [24]). The possibility correspondence associates, with each state, the set of states that she
considers possible. The player believes an event E at a state when the possibility set at ω is included in
the event E. The second is a type space ([22]), where each player’s probabilistic beliefs are induced by
her type mapping. The type mapping τi associates, with each state ω , her probability measure τi(ω) on
the underlying states at that state. The type mapping τi of player i induces her p-belief operator ([23]): it
associates, with each event E, the event that player i believes E with probability at least p.
With the framework in mind, I formalize the (meta-)certainty of a model in two steps. In the first
step, Section 3.1 expands the objects of the players’ beliefs from events to functions defined on the
underlying states. Examples of such functions are random variables, strategies, and type mappings. Any
such function x has to be defined on the state space Ω, but the co-domain X can be any set such as
the set R of real numbers (a random variable), a set Ai of player i’s actions (her strategy), and the set
∆(Ω) of probability measures on (Ω,D) (a type mapping). I call the function x : Ω→ X a signal if its
co-domain X has “observational” contents X (where “observation” is broadly construed as being an
object of reasoning): it is a collection of subsets of X such that each F ∈X is deemed an event x−1(F).
Formally, a signal (mapping) is a function x : (Ω,D)→ (X ,X ) such that each observation F ∈X is
considered to be an event x−1(F) ∈ D . Player i is certain of the value of the signal x at a state ω if,
for any observational content F that holds at ω (i.e., ω ∈ x−1(F)), player i believes the event x−1(F) at
ω (i.e., ω ∈ Bi(x−1(F))). Player i is certain of x if she is certain of the value of x at every state. For
example, let x : Ω→ X be the strategy of player i and let every singleton action a ∈ X be observable to
her; then, player i is certain of her own strategy if, wherever she takes an action a = x(ω) at a state ω , she
believes at ω that she takes action a. Having defined individual players’ (meta-)certainty, the players are
commonly certain of the value of the signal x at a state ω if, for any observational content F that holds
at ω , the event x−1(F) is common belief at ω (i.e., ω ∈C(x−1(F))). The players are commonly certain
of the signal x if they are commonly certain of its value at every state.
In the second step, Section 3.2 formulates a players’ “belief-generating map” as a signal that asso-
ciates, with each state, her beliefs at that state. By the second step, I can apply the formalization of
certainty and common certainty in the first step to the ingredients of a given model (i.e., players’ belief-
generating maps). To that end, take player i’s belief operator Bi from the model. I define a qualitative-type
mapping tBi : it associates, with each state, whether player i believes each event or not at that state (for-
mally, a binary set function from the collection of events to the binary values {0,1} where 1 indicates the
belief of an event). The qualitative-type mapping is a binary “type” mapping analogous to a type map-
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ping τi that represents player i’s probabilistic beliefs at each state in the context of probabilistic beliefs.
Thus, the qualitative-type mapping tBi associates, with each state ω , her qualitative belief tBi(ω) ∈ {0,1}
(where tBi(ω)(E) = 1 if and only if ω ∈ Bi(E)) on (Ω,D) at ω . The qualitative-type mapping tBi is
player i’s belief-generating mapping. Since the belief operator Bi and the qualitative-type mapping tBi
are equivalent means of representing player i’s beliefs, a model means the profile of qualitative-type
mappings. Thus, the formal test for whether the players are commonly certain of a given belief model is
whether the players are certain of the profile of their qualitative-type mappings.
Before asking when a player is certain of all the players’ qualitative-type mappings (i.e., the model),
Section 3.3 characterizes when a player is certain of her own qualitative type-mapping in terms of her
introspective properties of beliefs. Roughly, Proposition 1 shows that each player is certain of her own
qualitative-type mapping if and only if her belief is introspective.
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first paper which systematically formalizes the statement
that the players are (commonly) (meta-)certain of any given belief model within the model itself. The
main result on this question, nevertheless, is related to [21]. He constructs a particular syntactic model
in which the statement that the model is common knowledge is incorporated within itself. He formulates
the sense in which the model is commonly known from Positive Introspection of common knowledge: if
a statement is common knowledge then it is commonly known that the statement is common knowledge.
In Theorem 1, in contrast, the players are commonly certain of a given model if and only if, at each state
and for any event which some player believes at that state, it is common belief that the player believes the
event at that state. Thus, in this paper, the key criteria is the positive introspective property of common
belief with respect to each player’s beliefs. Whenever some individual player believes some event, it is
common belief that she believes it. [4, 5], in the context of partitional possibility correspondence models,
formalizes the event that a player has an information partition by regarding it as a function.
Having characterized the common-certainty of the model, Section 5 examines the role that the “com-
mon meta-certainty” assumption plays in the epistemic characterization of iterated elimination of strictly
dominated actions (IESDA) in a strategic game. Informally, it states: if the players are “logical,” if they
are commonly meta-certain of a game, and if they commonly believe their rationality, then the resulting
actions survive any process (i.e., any order) of IESDA. Formally, it states: if the players commonly be-
lieve their rationality and if their common belief in their rationality is correct, then the resulting actions
survive any process of IESDA.3 Theorem 2 connects these two statements. If the players’ beliefs are
monotone (they believe any logical implication of their beliefs), consistent (i.e., they do not simulta-
neously believe an event and its negation), and finitely conjunctive (if they believe E and F then they
believe its conjunction E ∩F), and if each player is certain of her own strategy and the part of her own
belief-generating process in the model (each player is not necessarily certain of how the opponents’ be-
liefs are generated in the model), then each player correctly believes her own rationality, and hence they
have correct common belief in their rationality. Thus, if the players are “logical” and each of them is
meta-certain of the part of the model that governs her own beliefs, then common belief in rationality
leads to actions that survive any process of IESDA.
On the one hand, Theorem 1 states that the players may not always be commonly certain of a belief
model in the sense that each player is commonly certain of how the other players’ beliefs are represented
within the model. On the other hand, Theorem 2 asserts that common belief in rationality leads to IESDA
even if the players may not be commonly certain of the belief model.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 defines a belief model. Section 3 characterizes the sense
3The formal statement is taken from [18, Theorem 3], which holds irrespective of the nature of beliefs. For seminal papers
on implications of common belief in rationality, see, for example, [9], [29], and [30].
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in which each player is certain of how her belief is generated in a model. Section 4 examines the sense
in which the players are commonly certain of a model itself (i.e., how the players’ beliefs are generated
in the model). Section 5 studies how the assumption that the players are commonly certain of a model
itself can make game-theoretic analyses coherent.
2 Framework
Throughout the paper, let I denote a non-empty finite set of players. The framework represents players’
interactive beliefs by belief operators on a state space. Section 2.1 defines a belief model. Section 2.2
defines properties of beliefs.
2.1 A Belief Model
A belief model is a tuple
−→
Ω := 〈(Ω,D),(Bi)i∈I,C〉, where: (i) (Ω,D) is a non-empty measurable space
of states of the world (call Ω the state space); (ii) Bi : D → D is player i’s (monotone) belief operator;
and (iii) C : D →D is a (monotone) common belief operator to be defined below.
While Ω constitutes a non-empty set of states of the world, each element E of D is an event about
which the players reason. For each event E, the set Bi(E) denotes the event that (i.e., the set of states at
which) a player i believes E. Thus, the player i∈ I believes an event E ∈D at a state ω ∈Ω if ω ∈ Bi(E).
I assume that each player’s belief operator satisfies Monotonicity: E ⊆F implies Bi(E)⊆Bi(F). It means
that if player i believes some event then she believes any of its logical consequences.4
Since the players’ beliefs are monotone, I introduce the common belief operator C : D→D following
[23]. Call an event E publicly evident if E ⊆ BI(E) :=
⋂
i∈I Bi(E). That is, everybody believes E when-
ever E is true. Denote by JBI the collection of publicly-evident events. An event E is common belief at a
state ω if there is a publicly-evident event that is true at ω and that implies the mutual belief in E: that is,
ω ∈ F ⊆ BI(E) for some F ∈JBI . Now, C is assumed to satisfy that the set of states at which E is com-
mon belief is an event for each E ∈D : C(E) := {ω ∈Ω | there is F ∈JBI with ω ∈ F ⊆ BI(E)} ∈D .
Since players’ beliefs are monotone and since D is closed under countable intersection, if E is com-





I (E). The converse (set inclusion) holds, for example, when the mutual belief
operator BI (or every Bi) satisfies Countable Conjunction:
⋂
n∈N BI(En) ⊆ BI(
⋂
n∈N En), meaning that
everybody believes the countable conjunction of events whenever everybody believes each of them.
I represent the players’ beliefs on a measurable space (Ω,D) so that I can analyze players’ qualitative
and probabilistic beliefs under the same framework. The full paper introduces the players’ probabilistic
beliefs on a measurable space (Ω,D) by p-belief operators [23]. For each p ∈ [0,1], player i’s p-belief
operator Bpi associates, with each event E, the event that player i believes E with probability at least p.
The full paper also introduces the common p-belief operator Cp.
2.2 Properties of Beliefs
Next, I introduce additional eight properties of beliefs. Various possibility correspondence models of
qualitative beliefs and knowledge are represented as belief models that satisfy certain properties specified
below. Fix a player i. I first introduce the following five logical properties of beliefs.
4The full paper dispenses with the monotonicity assumption, which enables one to define the meta-certainty of any belief
model.
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n∈N En) (for any events (En)n∈N).
3. Finite Conjunction: Bi(E)∩Bi(F)⊆ Bi(E ∩F).
4. The Kripke property: Bi(E) = {ω ∈Ω | bBi(ω)⊆ E}, where bBi(ω) :=
⋂
{E ∈D | ω ∈ Bi(E)} is
the set of states player i considers possible at ω .
5. Consistency: Bi(E)⊆ (¬Bi)(Ec).
First, Necessitation means that the player believes a tautology such as E ∪Ec. Second, as discussed,
Countable Conjunction means that if the player believes each of a countable collection of events, then she
believes its conjunction. Third, Finite Conjunction is weaker than Countable Conjunction: if the player
believes E and F then she believes its conjunction E ∩F . Fourth, to discuss the Kripke property, the
player considers ω ′ possible at ω if, for any event E which she believes at ω , E is true at ω ′. The Kripke
property provides the condition under which i’s belief is induced by her possibility correspondence bBi :
Ω→P(Ω): she believes E at ω if and only if (hereafter, iff) her possibility set bBi(ω) at ω implies E.
The Kripke property implies the previous three properties as well as Monotonicity. Fifth, Consistency
means that the player cannot simultaneously believe an event E and its negation Ec.
Next, I move on to truth and introspective properties.
6. Truth Axiom: Bi(E)⊆ E (for all E ∈D).
7. Positive Introspection: Bi(·)⊆ BiBi(·) (i.e., Bi(E)⊆ BiBi(E) for all E ∈D).
8. Negative Introspection: (¬Bi)(·)⊆ Bi(¬Bi)(·).
Sixth, Truth Axiom turns belief into knowledge in that knowledge has to be true while belief can be false.
Truth Axiom implies Consistency. While knowledge satisfies Truth Axiom, qualitative and probabilistic
beliefs are often assumed to satisfy Consistency. Seventh, Positive Introspection states that if the player
believes some event then she believes that she believes it. Eighth, Negative Introspection states that if
the player does not believe some event then she believes that she does not believe it. Truth Axiom and
Negative Introspection yield Positive Introspection (e.g., [3]).
Three remarks are in order. First, the introspective properties will play important roles in whether a
player is (meta-)certain of a belief model. Intuitively, Positive Introspection provides the sense in which
the player believes her own belief (at least at face value) while Negative Introspection yields the sense in
which the player believes the lack of her own belief. To see these points, an event E is self-evident to i if
E ⊆ Bi(E). That is, i believes E whenever E is true. Positive Introspection means that i’s belief in E is
self-evident to i, and Negative Introspection means that i’s lack of belief in E is self-evident to i. Denote
by JBi the collection of self-evident events to i.
Second, the last four properties are restated in terms of bBi under the Kripke property: Bi satisfies
Consistency iff bBi is serial (i.e., bBi(·) 6= /0); Bi satisfies Truth Axiom iff bBi is reflexive (i.e., ω ∈
bBi(ω) for all ω ∈ Ω); Bi satisfies Positive Introspection iff bBi is transitive (i.e., ω ′ ∈ bBi(ω) implies
bBi(ω
′) ⊆ bBi(ω)); and Bi satisfies Negative Introspection iff bBi is Euclidean (i.e., ω ′ ∈ bBi(ω) implies
bBi(ω)⊆ bBi(ω ′)).
Third, various models of probabilistic and qualitative beliefs and knowledge take different sets of
axioms. The framework accommodates possibility correspondence models of qualitative beliefs and
knowledge when Bi satisfies the Kripke property. A partitional model of knowledge corresponds to the
case when Bi satisfies Truth Axiom, Positive Introspection, and Negative Introspection.5 A reflexive
5In fact, Truth Axiom, Negative Introspection, and the Kripke property yield all the other properties defined in this section.
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and transitive (non-partitional) possibility correspondence model is characterized by Truth Axiom and
Positive Introspection.6 When it comes to fully-introspective qualitative beliefs, bBi is serial, transitive,
and Euclidean iff Bi satisfies Consistency, Positive Introspection, and Negative Introspection.
3 When Is a Player Certain of Her Belief-Generating Mapping?
Section 3.1 extends an object of beliefs in a model from an event to a function (“signal”) defined on
the state space. That is, the subsection formulates the statement that a player is certain of a function
defined on the state space. Section 3.2 represents a player’s “belief-generating mapping” as a signal
which associates, with each state, whether she believes each event or not. Section 3.3 asks the sense in
which she is certain of her own belief-generating mapping in terms of the introspective properties.
3.1 Functions as Objects of Players’ Beliefs
I start with defining a notion of a signal mapping. A signal mapping is any function x defined on the
state space Ω with “observational” contents. A signal is interpreted as a mapping from the underlying
state space Ω into a space of “observation” X endowed with “observational” contents X ⊆P(X). By
observation, it means that each F ∈X is deemed an object of reasoning. That is, we call a mapping x :
Ω→ X a signal mapping if each “observational” content F ∈X can be regarded as an event x−1(F)∈D
through inverting the mapping.
Formally, for a non-empty set X and a non-empty subset X of P(X), call x : (Ω,D)→ (X ,X )
a signal (mapping) if x−1(X ) ⊆ D . Mathematically, x : (Ω,D)→ (X ,X ) is a signal if x : (Ω,D)→
(X ,σ(X )) is measurable. Examples include strategies, random variables, and so on.
The main purpose of this subsection is to define the statement that a player is certain of a signal. A
player i is certain of the value of a signal x : (Ω,D)→ (X ,X ) at ω , if she believes any observational
content F (i.e., believes x−1(F)) at ω whenever it is true: x(ω) ∈ F . She is certain of the signal x :
(Ω,D)→ (X ,X ) if she is certain of its value at every ω . Likewise, the players are commonly certain
of the value of the signal x : (Ω,D)→ (X ,X ) at ω , if the players commonly believe any observational
content F at ω whenever it is true. The players are commonly certain of the signal x : (Ω,D)→ (X ,X )
if they are certain of its value at every ω . Formally:
Definition 1. Let
−→
Ω be a belief model, and let x : (Ω,D)→ (X ,X ) be a signal mapping.
1. (a) Player i is certain of the value of the signal x : (Ω,D)→ (X ,X ) at ω if ω ∈ Bi(x−1(F)) for
any F ∈X with x(ω) ∈ F .
(b) Player i is certain of the signal x : (Ω,D)→ (X ,X ) if she is certain of the value of the signal
x at any state.
2. (a) The players are commonly certain of the value of the signal x : (Ω,D)→ (X ,X ) at ω if
ω ∈C(x−1(F)) for any F ∈X with x(ω) ∈ F .
(b) The players are commonly certain of the signal x : (Ω,D)→ (X ,X ) if they are commonly
certain of the value of the signal x is at every state.
For example, suppose that x : Ω→ X is a decision function of a player which associates, with each
state, the action taken at that state. Suppose the set of actions X is endowed with the collection of
singleton actions X = {{a} | a ∈ X}. Each action a corresponds to an observational content to the
6See, for example, [4], [6], [15], [20], [25], [27], and [28].
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player, and x is a signal mapping if the set of states at which the player takes action a is an event:
x−1({a}) = {ω ∈Ω | x(ω) = a} ∈D for each a ∈ X .
More specifically, let Ω = {ω1,ω2,ω3} and X = {a,b}. For each i ∈ I = {1,2}, let Bi be given
by (i) Bi(E) = E \ {ω3} for each E 6= Ω; and (ii) Bi(Ω) = Ω. Suppose player 1’s decision function
x : (Ω,P(Ω))→ (X ,{{a},{b}}) is given by (x(ω))ω∈Ω = (a,a,a). Since B1(Ω) = Ω and B1( /0) =
/0, whenever player 1 takes a certain action, she believes that she takes that action. Thus, player 1 is
certain of x. If, instead, her decision function x : (Ω,P(Ω))→ (X ,{{a},{b}}) is given by (x(ω))ω∈Ω =
(a,b,a), then at ω3 at which she takes action a, she does not believe that she takes action a, because
B1({ω1,ω3}) = {ω1}. Thus, player 1 is not certain of the value of x at x3. Since C = B1, the same
arguments hold for the common certainty of x.
For ease of terminology, player i is certain of (the value of) the signal x : Ω→ X (at ω) with respect
to X if she is certain of (the value of) the signal x : (Ω,D)→ (X ,X ) (at ω). Likewise, the players are
commonly certain of (the value of) the signal x : Ω→ X (at ω) with respect to X if they are commonly
certain of (the value of) the signal x : (Ω,D)→ (X ,X ) (at ω).
Four remarks on Definition 1 are in order. First, I restate the fact that a player is certain of a signal in
terms of self-evidence. Namely, player i is certain of a signal x : (Ω,D)→ (X ,X ) iff any observational
content F ∈X (i.e., any event x−1(F) ∈ D) is self-evident to i. Likewise, the players are commonly
certain of the signal x : (Ω,D) → (X ,X ) iff any observational content F ∈ X is publicly-evident.
Consequently, the players are commonly certain of a signal iff every player is certain of it.7
Second, when x : (Ω,D)→ (X ,X ) is a player’s strategy, Definition 1 formalizes the statement that
the player is certain of the strategy (e.g., [12] and [20]). To see this, assume that X contains a singleton
{x(ω)} to reason about the action taken at ω . That is, the set of states [x(ω)] := x−1({x(ω)}) = {ω ′ ∈
Ω | x(ω ′) = x(ω)} at which player i takes the same action as she does at ω is an event. Then, player
i is certain of her strategy iff [x(ω)] is self-evident at every ω ∈ Ω. In words, player i is certain of her
strategy x iff, whenever she takes action a = x(ω) at ω , she believes at ω that she takes action a = x(ω).
Definition 1 also subsumes the formulation of the certainty of the strategy by [2] in the (countable)
partitional state space model of knowledge. Let (bBi(ω))ω∈Ω be a countable partition on Ω. In [2], the
player “knows” her own strategy x iff the strategy x is measurable with respect to the partition (which
turns out to be equivalent to bBi(·)⊆ [x(·)]). Since the partition is countable, the σ -algebra generated by
the partition is equal to the self-evident collection: JBi = σ({bBi(ω) ∈D | ω ∈Ω}). Hence, player i is
certain of her strategy x : (Ω,D)→ (X ,X ) iff x : (Ω,JBi)→ (X ,σ(X )) is measurable.
Third, player i satisfies Necessitation iff she is certain of any constant signal. Likewise, the common
belief operator C satisfies Necessitation (equivalently, every Bi satisfies Necessitation) iff the players are
commonly certain of any constant signal.
Necessitation allows the players to be certain of any constant “random” variable that does not depend
on the realization of a state. For example, consider whether player i is certain that an event B j(E) is
equal to an event F in a belief model. The outside analysts determine whether player i believes that
player j believes an event E at a state ω by examining whether ω ∈ BiB j(E) since player j’s belief
B j(E) itself is an event. The (implicit) assumption in any (semantic) belief model is that E = F implies
Bi(E) = Bi(F). Thus, if two events are extensionally the same, then each player’s belief in the two
events are the same.8 To assess player i’s belief about player j’s belief about E, how can the outside
7In contrast, it is not necessarily the case that each player is certain of a signal at a state ω iff the players are commonly
certain of the signal at ω .
8 Although such identification of events are implicitly assumed for any (semantic) belief model, one can construct a canon-
ical (“universal”) semantic model from a syntactic language which maximally distinguishes the denotations of events. In the
canonical model, such identification of events can be minimized in a way such that two events are equated only when they are
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analysts justify the fact that player i is able to equate B j(E) with another event (say, F)? Since either
B j(E) = F or B j(E) 6= F , player i is certain that B j(E) is an event F if player i is certain of the indicator
function IB j↔F , where (B j(E)↔ F) := ((¬B j)(E)∪F)∩((¬F)∪B j(E)). If player i’s belief operator Bi
satisfies Necessitation and if B j(E) = F , then player i is certain of the constant indicator function IB j↔F .
Thus, under Necessitation, player i is certain that B j(E) = F if it is indeed the case. This argument
justifies that, under Necessitation, the outside analysts can say that the players are certain of equating
two extensionally equivalent events (say, B j(E) and F) if they are indeed extensionally equivalent.
Fourth, it can be formally shown that player i is certain of a profile of signals (e.g., a strategy profile)
iff she is certain of each of them. Thus, the players are commonly certain of a profile of signals iff every
player is certain of every signal.
3.2 A Qualitative-Type Mapping that Represents a Player’s Beliefs
In order to formulate a test under which the outside analysts can examine whether the players are com-
monly certain of a belief model, I define the “belief-generating map,” which I call the qualitative-type
mapping ([17]), of a player. Given the belief operator of the player, the qualitative-type mapping asso-
ciates, with each state, a binary value indicating whether the player believes each event in an analogous
manner to the type mapping in the type-space literature.
To that end, recall that a (probabilistic-)type mapping associates, with each state ω , the player’s
probabilistic beliefs τi(ω) ∈ ∆(Ω) at that state. With this in mind, let M(Ω) be the set of binary set
functions µ : D → {0,1} (i.e., M(Ω) ⊆ {0,1}D ) that satisfy a given set of logical properties of beliefs
defined in Section 2.2 (these properties will be shortly expressed in terms of µ). Call each µ ∈M(Ω) a
qualitative-type. Interpret µ(E) = 1 as the belief in an event E ∈D . Once M(Ω)⊆ {0,1}D is defined as
the set of qualitative-types that satisfy the given set of logical properties of beliefs, I represent player i’s
beliefs by a qualitative-type mapping ti : Ω→M(Ω) satisfying a certain measurability condition specified
below. It is a measurable mapping which associates, with each state ω ∈ Ω, player i’s qualitative-type
ti(ω) ∈M(Ω) at ω . Thus, player i believes an event E at ω if ti(ω)(E) = 1.
Now, I define the logical properties of µ in an analogous way to the corresponding logical properties
of belief operators. Fix µ ∈ {0,1}D .
0. Monotonicity: E ⊆ F implies µ(E)≤ µ(F).
1. Necessitation: µ(Ω) = 1.
2. Countable Conjunction: minn∈N µ(En)≤ µ(
⋂
n∈N En).
3. Finite Conjunction: min(µ(E),µ(F))≤ µ(E ∩F).
4. The Kripke property: µ(E) = 1 iff
⋂
{F ∈D | µ(F) = 1} ⊆ E.
5. Consistency: µ(E)≤ 1−µ(Ec).
The interpretations of the above properties are similar to those in Section 2.2. Whether all of these
properties are assumed or not depend on the model that the outside analysts study. For example, if
the outside analysts examine a partitional possibility correspondence model, then M(Ω) is the set of
qualitative-types that satisfy all the logical properties.
I formally define the measurability condition of a qualitative-type mapping. A qualitative-type map-
ping is a measurable mapping ti : (Ω,D)→ (M(Ω),DM) which satisfies given (logical and) introspective
properties of beliefs, where DM is the σ -algebra generated by the sets of the form βE := {µ ∈M(Ω) |
explicitly assumed to be equivalent by the outside analysts (see [19] for a formal assertion).
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µ(E) = 1} for all E ∈D . The set βE is the set of types under which E is believed. Thus, βE is an infor-
mational content indicating that event E is believed. Note that ti : Ω→M(Ω), by construction, satisfies
given logical properties because any element in M(Ω) satisfies them. For example, if every µ ∈M(Ω)
satisfies the Kripke property, then every ti(ω) satisfies it. Denote bti(ω) :=
⋂
{E ∈D | ti(ω)(E) = 1} for
each ω ∈Ω.
The measurablity condition of ti requires each t−1i (βE) = {ω ∈Ω | ti(ω)(E) = 1} to be the event that
player i believes E. Next, I define Truth Axiom and the introspective properties of ti.
6. Truth Axiom: ti(ω)(E) = 1 implies ω ∈ E.
7. Positive Introspection: ti(ω)(E) = 1 implies ti(ω)(t−1i (βE)) = 1.
8. Negative Introspection: ti(ω)(E) = 0 implies ti(ω)(¬t−1i (βE)) = 1.
3.3 Certainty of Own Type Mapping
I apply the certainty of a signal to a qualitative-type mapping. Proposition 1 below roughly states that a
player is certain of her own qualitative-type mapping iff her beliefs are introspective.
Proposition 1. Let
−→
Ω be a belief model, and let tBi : Ω→M(Ω) be player i’s qualitative-type mapping.
1. (a) Player i is certain of tBi with respect to {βE | E ∈D} iff Bi satisfies Positive Introspection.
(b) Player i is certain of tBi with respect to {¬βE | E ∈D} iff Bi satisfies Negative Introspection.
(c) If player i is certain of tBi : (Ω,D)→ (M(Ω),DM), then Bi satisfies Positive Introspection
and Negative Introspection.
2. (a) Let Bi satisfy Truth Axiom. Player i is certain of tBi : (Ω,D)→ (M(Ω),DM) iff Bi satisfies
(Positive Introspection and) Negative Introspection.
(b) Let Bi satisfy Consistency and Countable Conjunction. Player i is certain of tBi : (Ω,D)→
(M(Ω),DM) iff Bi satisfies Positive Introspection and Negative Introspection.
Part (1) characterizes the certainty of the qualitative-type mapping tBi with respect to the possession
or lack of beliefs. In contrast, Parts (2a) and (2b), respectively, examine the sense in which player i is
certain of her qualitative-type mapping tBi : (Ω,D)→ (M(Ω),DM) in a model of knowledge and belief.
Part (1a) states that player i is certain of her qualitative-type mapping tBi with respect to the possession
of beliefs iff her belief operator Bi satisfies Positive Introspection. Parts (1a) and (1b) jointly state that
Bi satisfies Positive Introspection and Negative Introspection iff player i is certain of her qualitative-type
mapping tBi with respect to {βE | E ∈D}∪{¬βE | E ∈D}.
I discuss two implications of Proposition 1. First, it sheds light on the literature of non-partitional
knowledge models without Negative Introspection (see footnote 6). Part (1) implies that, without impos-
ing Negative Introspection, player i is not certain of her own qualitative-type mapping with respect to
DM (or {βE | E ∈D}∪{¬βE | E ∈D}). Rather, she takes her own information at face value in the sense
that she is only certain of her qualitative-type mapping with respect to her own beliefs {βE | E ∈ D}.
Proposition 1 formalizes the sense in which “she takes her own information at face value.”
In contrast, Proposition 1 (2a) shows that, in a partitional possibility correspondence model of knowl-
edge, a player is fully certain of her possibility correspondence when Truth Axiom, (Positive Introspec-
tion) and Negative Introspection hold. While the proposition does not necessarily require Bi to satisfy
the Kripke property, consider a model of knowledge in which Bi satisfies Truth Axiom and the Kripke
property, i.e., Bi is induced by the reflexive possibility correspondence bBi . Then, player i is certain of
her “knowledge-generating” mapping iff Bi satisfies (Positive Introspection and) Negative Introspection.
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Proposition 1 (2b) shows that, for a serial possibility correspondence, a player is fully certain of her
possibility correspondence when her beliefs satisfy Positive Introspection and Negative Introspection.
Second, suppose a player has qualitative belief and knowledge. Consider a model 〈(Ω,D),(Ki)i∈I,C〉
where Ki : D→D is player i’s (monotone) knowledge operator. Now, for each player i, let Bi : D→D be
her (monotone) qualitative-belief operator. Let tBi be player i’s qualitative-type mapping that represents
Bi, and ask whether player i is certain of her qualitative-type mapping tBi : (Ω,D)→ (M(Ω),DM). Propo-
sition 1 (2a) implies that player i is certain of tBi : (Ω,D)→ (M(Ω),DM) iff Ki satisfies Positive Certainty
(with respect to Bi): Bi(·)⊆ KiBi(·) and Negative Certainty (with respect to Bi): (¬Bi)(·)⊆ Ki(¬Bi)(·).
Whenever player i believes an event, she knows that she believes it. Whenever player i does not believe
an event, she knows that she does not believe it. In fact, these two properties are often assumed in a
model of belief and knowledge. Proposition 1 (2a) justifies the assumptions in terms of the certainty of
one’s knowledge about her own beliefs.
4 When are the Players Commonly Certain of a Bleief Model?
I formalize the sense in which the players are commonly certain of a belief model itself: the players are
commonly certain of the profile of their qualitative-type mappings. As discussed, it is sufficient to ask
when every player i is certain of each player j’s qualitative-type mapping.
To that end, observe that Proposition 1 applies to the case in which player i is certain of player
j’s qualitative-type mapping. For example, if player i is certain of player j’s qualitative-type mapping
t j : (Ω,D)→ (M(Ω),DM), then Bt j(·)⊆BiBt j(·) and (¬Bt j)(·)⊆Bi(¬Bt j)(·) hold. Proposition 1 implies:
Remark 1. Let
−→
Ω be a belief model, and let tB j : Ω→M(Ω) be player j’s qualitative-type mapping.
1. (a) Player i is certain of tB j with respect to {βE | E ∈D} iff B j(·)⊆ BiB j(·).
(b) Player i is certain of tB j with respect to {¬βE | E ∈D} iff (¬B j)(·)⊆ Bi(¬B j)(·).
(c) If player i is certain of tB j : (Ω,D)→ (M(Ω),DM), then B j(·) ⊆ BiB j(·) and (¬B j)(·) ⊆
Bi(¬B j)(·).
2. (a) Let Bi satisfy Truth Axiom. Player i is certain of tB j : (Ω,D)→ (M(Ω),DM) iff (B j(·) ⊆
BiB j(·) and) (¬B j)(·)⊆ Bi(¬B j)(·).
(b) Let Bi satisfy Consistency and Countable Conjunction. Player i is certain of tB j : (Ω,D)→
(M(Ω),DM) iff B j(·)⊆ BiB j(·) and (¬B j)(·)⊆ Bi(¬B j)(·).
Roughly, Remark 1 states that player i is certain of player j’s qualitative-type mapping tB j if and only
if (i) whenever player j believes an event E at ω , player i believes player j believes E at ω; and (ii)
whenever player j does not believe an event E at ω , player i believes player j does not believe E at ω .
Now, I ask when the players are commonly certain of the qualitative-type mappings in a belief model.
Theorem 1. Let
−→
Ω be a belief model, and let tBi : Ω→M(Ω) be player i’s qualitative-type mapping.
1. Assume Truth Axiom for every Bi. The players are commonly certain of the profile of qualitative-
type mappings tBi : (Ω,D)→ (M(Ω),DM) iff Bi = B j for every i, j ∈ I, (Positive Introspection),
and Negative Introspection. In particular, Bi =C for each i ∈ I.
2. Assume Consistency and Countable Conjunction for every Bi. The players are commonly cer-
tain of the profile of qualitative-type mappings tBi : (Ω,D)→ (M(Ω),DM) iff Bi(·) ⊆CBi(·) and
(¬Bi)(·)⊆C(¬Bi)(·) for every i ∈ I. In particular, C = BI .
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While Part (1) studies a knowledge model, Part (2) does a belief model. I start with discussing
implications of Part (2). This part states that the players are commonly certain of their qualitative-type
mappings iff (i) for any event E which some player i believes at some state ω , it is commonly believed
that player i believes E at ω; and (ii) for any event E which some player i does not believe at some state
ω , it is commonly believed that player i does not believe E at ω .
This part imposes a strong requirement that, under Consistency and Countable Conjunction, the mu-
tual belief and common belief operators coincide if the players are commonly certain of their qualitative-
type mappings.9 For any event E which everybody believes at some state ω , it is commonly believed that
everybody believes E at ω: BI(·) ⊆CBI(·). Intuitively, in a model of which the players are commonly
certain, if everybody believes an event E then it is common belief that everybody believes E. Thus, if
everybody believes E then everybody believes that everybody believes E. Hence, the first-order mutual
belief itself implies any higher-order mutual beliefs, and thus the mutual and common beliefs coincide.
Next, Part (1) provides a contrast between knowledge and belief. In a knowledge model with Truth
Axiom, for the players to be commonly certain of the model, it is necessary that their knowledge coin-
cides with each other. In contrast, in a belief model without Truth Axiom, there exists a model in which
the players’ beliefs are different but they are commonly certain of their qualitative-type mappings.
Yet, Theorem 1 is an impossibility result in the following sense. In Part (1), every player’s knowl-
edge operator coincides. In Part (2), the mutual and common belief operators coincide. In this regard,
informally, Theorem 1 has some similarity with the impossibility of agreeing-to-disagree [1]: (under a
common prior) if two players have common knowledge of their posteriors then the posteriors coincide.
Here, if players are commonly certain of their knowledge operators, then their knowledge operators
coincide.
Finally, as an implication of Theorem 1, suppose that the players are commonly certain of a belief
model. If player i is certain of a signal x, then is player j certain of the signal x, too? While the players’
beliefs may not be homogeneous, the proposition below shows that this is the case.
Proposition 4. Let
−→
Ω be a belief model such that each Bi satisfies Consistency. Let x : (Ω,D)→ (X ,X )
be a signal such that, for any F ∈X , there exists a sub-collection (Fλ )λ∈Λ of X with Fc =
⋃
λ∈Λ Fλ .
1. If player i is certain of x : (Ω,D)→ (X ,X ) and if player j is certain of player i’s qualitative-type
mapping tBi : (Ω,D)→ (M(Ω),DM), then player j is certain of x : (Ω,D)→ (X ,X ).
2. Suppose that the players are commonly certain of the profile of their qualitative-type mappings
tBi : (Ω,D)→ (M(Ω),DM). Then, player i is certain of x : (Ω,D)→ (X ,X ) iff player j is certain
of x : (Ω,D)→ (X ,X ).
The meta-common-certainty assumption states that if player i is certain of her own strategy and if
player j is certain of player i’s type mapping then player j is certain of player i’s strategy. In particular,
if the players are commonly certain of the profile of their type mappings and if each player is certain of
her own strategy, then it follows that the players are commonly certain of the strategy profile. The next
section examines the role of such meta-certainty assumptions on game-theoretic solution concepts.
9The converse does not hold, i.e., C = BI does not necessarily imply that the players are certain of the profile of their
qualitative-type mappings.
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5 What Role Does the “Meta-Certainty” of a Model Play in Game-theoretic
Analyses?
This section studies the role that the “meta-certainty” assumption plays in game-theoretic analyses of
solution concepts. Specifically, it considers the solution concept of iterated elimination of strictly dom-
inated actions (IESDA) in a strategic game. Informally, an epistemic characterization of IESDA states
that, in a strategic game, if the (i) “logical” players are (ii) “commonly (meta-)certain of the game” and
if they (iii) commonly believe their rationality, then their resulting actions survive IESDA. Formally, in
the context of the framework of this paper, [18] shows that if the players commonly believe each player’s
rationality and if each of them correctly believes their own rationality, then their resulting actions survive
IESDA, without assuming any property on individual players’ beliefs. This paper connects these two
statements as follows: first, suppose that the players are logical in that their beliefs satisfy Consistency
and Finite Conjunction in addition to Monotonicity. Second, suppose that each of them is certain of
their own qualitative-type mapping and strategy. Third, suppose that the players commonly believe their
rationality. Then, their resulting actions survive IESDA.
Here I show that the certainty (of her own strategy and type mapping) allows her to correctly believe
her own rationality. In other words, if a player is able to reason about informativeness of her own beliefs,
she is able to correctly believe her own rationality.
5.1 A Strategic Game, a Model of a Game, and Rationality
To define the notion of rationality in a game, define a (strategic) game as a tuple Γ = 〈(Ai)i∈I,(<i)i∈I〉:
Ai is a non-empty at-most-countable set of player i’s actions, and <i is i’s (complete and transitive) pref-
erence relation on A :=×i∈I Ai.10 Denote by ∼i and i the indifference and strict relations, respectively.
A (belief) model of the game Γ is a tuple 〈(Ω,D),(Bi)i∈I,C,(σi)i∈I〉 (abusing the notation, denote it
by
−→
Ω ) with the following two properties. First, 〈(Ω,D),(Bi)i∈I,C〉 is a belief model. Second, σi : Ω→Ai
is a strategy of player i satisfying the measurability condition that σ−1i ({ai}) ∈D for all ai ∈ Ai. Denote
[σi(ω)] := σ−1i ({σi(ω)}) for each ω ∈Ω.
Denote by [a′i <i ai] := {ω ′ ∈ Ω | (a′i,σi(ω ′)) <i (ai,σ−i(ω ′))} ∈ D for any ai,a′i ∈ Ai. In words,
[a′i <i ai] is the event that player i prefers taking action a
′
i to ai given the opponents’ strategies σ−i.
The set [a′i <i ai] is an event because [a
′
i <i ai] = σ
−1
−i ({a−i ∈ A−i | (a′i,a−i) i (ai,a−i)}) ∈ D . Define
[a′i i ai] and [a′i ∼i ai] analogously.
Denote by RATi the event that player i is rational (see, e.g., [7, 8, 14]):
RATi :={ω ∈Ω | ω ∈ Bi([a′i i σi(ω)]) for no a′i ∈ Ai}.
It can be seen that RATi is indeed an event. Let RATI :=
⋂
i∈I RATi. Player i is rational at ω ∈ Ω if
there is no action a′i ∈ Ai such that she believes that playing a′i is strictly better than playing σi(ω) given
the opponents’ strategies σ−i. In other words, player i is rational at ω if, for any action a′i, she always
considers it possible that playing σi(ω) is at least as good as playing a′i given the opponents’ strategies
σ−i: ω ∈ (¬Bi)(¬[σi(ω)<i a′i]) for any a′i ∈ Ai.
Now, the epistemic characterization of IESDA is stated as follows. Suppose that each player i cor-
rectly believes her own rationality: Bi(RATi) ⊆ RATi. If every player’s rationality is common belief at
10The assumption on the cardinality of each action set Ai is to simplify the analysis. It guarantees that each player is able to
reason about any subset of action profiles and that the rationality of each player is an event.
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ω , i.e., ω ∈
⋂
i∈I C(RATi), then the resulting actions (σi(ω))i∈I ∈ A survive any process of IESDA.11
Finally, player i is certain of her own strategy σi if she is certain of σi : (Ω,D)→ (Ai,{{ai} | ai ∈Ai}),
equivalently, [σi(·)]⊆ Bi([σi(·)]). Note that, under Consistency in addition to Monotonicity, if player i is
certain of her own strategy then Bi([σi(·)]) = [σi(·)], [σi(·)]c = Bi([σi(·)]c), and Bi(Ω) = Ω.12
5.2 The Role of Meta-certainty in Correctly Believing One’s Own Rationality
I ask under what conditions player i correctly believes her own rationality: Bi(RATi) ⊆ RATi. For
qualitative belief, the standard assumptions on qualitative belief (i.e., Consistency, Positive Introspection,
Negative Introspection, and the Kripke property) guarantee that Bi(RATi) = RATi (e.g., [7, 8]).13 Here, I
provide a compatibility condition on belief with informativeness, under which a player correctly believes
her own rationality. The compatibility condition does not hinge on a particular form of belief, i.e.,
whether it is qualitative or probabilistic.
To that end, a state ω is at least as informative as another state ω ′ to i (precisely, according to
tBi) iff tBi(ω
′)(·) ≤ tBi(ω)(·). Fix ω ∈ Ω, and let (↑ tBi(ω)) := {ω ′ ∈ Ω | tBi(ω)(·) ≤ tBi(ω ′)(·)} be the
set of states that are at least as informative to i as ω . Under the Kripke property, ω ′ ∈ (↑ tBi(ω)) iff
bBi(ω
′)⊆ bBi(ω). The full paper extensively studies the notion of informativeness. Now:
Definition 2. Player i’s belief (operator Bi) is compatible with informativeness if (↑ tBi(ω))∩E 6= /0 for
any E ∈D with ω ∈ Bi(E).
In words, player i’s beliefs are compatible with informativeness if, for any event E which player i
believes at some ω , there exists a state ω ′ in E which is at least as informative as ω . In the context of
qualitative beliefs, if player i’s belief operator Bi satisfies the Kripke property, Consistency, and Positive
Introspection, then Bi is compatible with informativeness. The compatibility with informativeness does
not necessarily imply the Kripke property (and vice versa). If player i’s belief operator Bi is compatible
with informativeness, then it satisfies Bi( /0) = /0. Thus, under Finite Conjunction, if Bi is compatible with
informativeness, then it satisfies Consistency.
The following proposition states that the compatibility of beliefs with informativeness is implied by
the certainty of a type mapping.
Proposition 5. Let
−→
Ω be a belief model. Assume: (i) (↑ tBi(·)) ∈ D; (ii) Bi satisfies Consistency and
Finite Conjunction; and that (iii) player i is certain of tBi : Ω→ M(Ω) with respect to {{µ ∈ M(Ω) |
µ(·)≥ tBi(ω)(·)} | ω ∈Ω}. Then, Bi is compatible with informativeness.
The proposition states that, under the regularity condition (i), if player i is logical (in that her belief
operator satisfies Consistency and Finite Conjunction) and if she is certain of her qualitative-type map-
ping, then her beliefs are compatible with informativeness. Theorem 2 below establishes that if player
i’s beliefs are compatible with informativeness then she correctly believes her rationality, which is a part
of the preconditions of the epistemic characterization of IESDA.
11Since each player’s belief operator Bi satisfies Monotonicity, Bi(RATI) ⊆
⋂
i∈I Bi(RATi) and C(RATI) ⊆
⋂
i∈I C(RATi).
Thus, if every player i correctly believes the rationality of the players, then each player correctly believes her own rationality.
Likewise, if it is common belief that the players are rational, then, for every i ∈ I, it is common belief that player i is rational.
Hence, I examine the weaker condition that each player i correctly believes her own rationality.
12Thus, under Consistency and Monotonicity of Bi, the certainty of own strategy implies that if player i is rational at ω , then
she never takes a strictly dominated action at ω (if she takes a strictly dominated action, then her belief violates Necessitation).
13It can be seen that Consistency, Positive Introspection, and the Kripke property in addition to the certainty of i’s own
strategy yield Bi(RATi) ⊆ RATi. Likewise, Negative Introspection and the Kripke property in addition to the certainty of i’s
own strategy yield RATi ⊆ Bi(RATi).
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Now, the main result of this section is as follows: a player correctly believes her own rationality if:
(i) she is certain of her own strategy; (ii) her belief is compatible with the informativeness; and if (iii) her
belief is (finitely) conjunctive so that she can simultaneously reason about her own strategy and her own
rationality.
Theorem 2. Suppose that player i is certain of her own strategy (i.e., [σi(·)] ⊆ Bi([σi(·)])). Also, let Bi
be compatible with informativeness and satisfy Finite Conjunction. Then, player i correctly believes her
own rationality: Bi(RATi)⊆ RATi.
Proposition 5 and Theorem 2 imply that player i correctly believes her own rationality if she is logical
in that her belief operator satisfies Consistency and Finite Conjunction and if she is certain of her own
type mapping and strategy. Theorem 2 states that, for the role of the meta-certainty assumption of a
belief model on IESDA, it is not necessary that each player is certain of the profile of type mappings but
it is sufficient that each player is certain of her own type mapping. One can incorporate the assumptions
that each player is certain of her own qualitative type-mapping and strategy into the condition that she is
certain of the part of the model of a game 〈(Ω,D),(tBi ,σi)〉 that dictates her beliefs and strategy.
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